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mitted that the Court's refusal to overturn Denver and to treat all of
the contractors at the jobsite as allies indicates a continuing judicial
disregard for the peculiarities of the construction industry.
THOMAS E. HUMPHREY
Gift Tax—Valuation—Political Contributions—Stern v. United
States.'
—Mrs. Stern, a resident of Louisiana, concerned about her
state's lag in economic growth in comparison with other southern
states2
 and about the effect upon her property and personal interests,
and believing that this economic climate was caused by an adverse
political situation, joined certain other Louisiana citizens to support
the institution of a reform government within the state and the city
of New Orleans. In pursuit of this objective, these individuals estab-
lished an informal finance committee, chose one of its members to be
"Treasurer," and made contributions to the Treasurer's bank account.
The plaintiff's contributions were $44,600 in 1959 and 1960, and
$16,250 in 1961.2 These funds were spent by the Treasurer for hand-
bills, posters and magazine and television advertising in accordance
with the desires of the contributors, but at no time were funds given
to the political candidates for their direct use or control.
In 1959, 1960 and 1961, the plaintiff, although filing federal gift
tax returns, did not report these "contributions" as gifts. Instead, she
attached to her tax return a note stating that these were not gifts but
"expenditures which I made to protect my property and personal in-
terests by promoting efficiency in Government,'" and that the disburse-
ments were made by individuals acting in her behalf. Thereafter, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that the contributions
were gifts and assessed gift taxes accordingly. Upon paying these taxes,
Mrs. Stern brought suit in district court seeking a refund of the amount
paid. The court found that these expenditures were made "in the ordi-
nary course of business" as defined in Treasury Regulation Section 25.-
2512-8,° that there was no transfer of cash or property to any candidate
I 436 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1971).
2
 The court noted that Louisiana's per capita income, which was 73% of the na-
tional average in 1950, had slipped to 71.7% in 1961, and placed 44th nationally; and
that from 1950-1960, while Texas, North Carolina and Mississippi gained a total of
275,000 manufacturing jobs, Louisiana lost 2500 manufacturing jobs. Id. at 1328.
a The gift tax does not apply to the first $3,000 given to a donee per year, Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, § 2503(b), nor to the first $30,000 given during the donor's lifetime. Int.
Rev. Code of 1954, § 2521.
4 436 F.2d at 1329.
5
 Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1958) reads in part:
Transfers reached by the gift tax are not confined to those only which, be-
ing without a valuable consideration, accord with the common law concept of
gifts, but embrace as well sales, exchanges, and other dispositions of property
for a consideration to the extent that the value of the property transferred by
the donor exceeds the value in money or money's worth of the consideration
given therefor. However, a sale, exchange, or other transfer of property made
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or political party, and that she received full and adequate consideration
for these political expenditures.° On appeal, the Fifth Circuit HELD:
that the district court did not err in determining that these expenditures
were made in the ordinary course of business and affirmed for this
reason without considering the other bases upon which the trial court
relied.
Since the government did not appeal the district court's finding
that the transaction was "bona fide, at arm's length, and free from any
donative intent," the court of appeals limited itself to the question of
the construction of that part of Treasury Regulation section 25.2512-8
which provides an exception to the full and adequate consideration re-
quirement for a "transfer of property made in the ordinary course of
business."T Citing several cases8 which extend the "in the ordinary
course of business" requirement beyond the area of commercial trans-
actions, and which do not restrict its application to "ordinary and
necessary"' business expenses, the Fifth Circuit rejected the appel-
lant's narrow construction of the regulation that the transfer had to be
made in the course of an actual business carried on by Mrs. Stern. In
concluding that the transactions were exempt from the gift tax, the
court also noted, by way of dicta, that the taxpayer's control over the
distribution of the funds, and the existing economic factors were sig-
nificant additional elements allowing the exemption.°
Although the Internal Revenue Service has indicated" that indi-
viduals making contributions or gifts to a political party or to a candi-
date for public office are liable for the gift tax, the court in Stern did
not reach this issue due to its resolUtion of the meaning of "in the or-
dinary course of business." The court's decision repudiating the ap-
pellant's interpretation of the Treasury Regulation appears correct,
yet the implications arising therefrom, and the court's dicta that po-
litical contributions in any form qualify as transfers in the ordinary
course of business, appear to be unsupportable. Commencing from the
proposition that most gift tax cases must be decided on their own
facts,' this note will analyze the merits of the court's opinion that
in the ordinary course of business (a transaction which is bona fide, at arm's•
length and free from any donative intent), will be considered as made for an
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth. A consideration not
reducible to a value in money or moneey's worth, as love and affection, promise
of marriage, etc., is to be wholly disregarded, and the entire value of the prop-
erty transferred constitutes the amount of the gift. . . .
6 304 F. Supp. 376 (E.D. La. 1969).
7 The two requirements essential for the gift tax to be applicable are a transfer of
property and less than full and adequate consideration. Lowndes, An Introduction to
the Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, 44 N.C.L. Rev. 1, 51 (1965).
s Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106 (1950) ; Rosenthal v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d
505 (2d Cir. 1953); Estate of Monroe D. Anderson, 8 T.C. 706 (1947) ; Carl E. Weller,
38 T.C. 790 (1962) ; Shelton v. Lockhart, 154 F. Supp. 244 (W.D. Mo. 1957).
0 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162(a).
10 436 F.2d at 1330.
11 Rev. Rul. 59-57, 1959-1 Cum. Bull. 626.
12 Eleanor A. Bradford, 34 T.C. 1059, 1063 (1960).
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Mrs. Stern's contributions were made "in the ordinary course of busi-
ness," and will evaluate the effect of Stern upon future contributors to
political parties who might employ similar arrangements in order to
escape the gift tax.'
The Internal Revenue Code provides that the gift tax shall be ap-
plied to transfers of property which involve "less than an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth... .i 14 This requirement
attempts to prevent depletion of one's taxable estate through transfers
which return only nominal consideration, but which consideration is
adequate for contractual purposes." Most easily discernible of such
taxable transfers is the transfer of property for money consideration
less than the value of the property transferred, with the excess value
subject to a gift tax." In non-monetary exchanges the fact that the
consideration is sufficient to support a contract at common law would
not fulfill the statutory requirement, since the consideration in some
cases need only be nominal for contractual purposes.'
Judicial finding of adequate consideration in a transfer is even
less likely when the contested consideration probably would not be suf-
ficient at common law. In DuPont v. United States,' 8 which presented
a fact situation similar to Stern, but which was not brought under the
"in the ordinary course of business" exception, the petitioner contrib-
uted $6,000 to the National Economic Council (N.E.C.), an organiza-
tion created to preserve private enterprise and private property by
maintaining a speaker's bureau, publishing articles and making ap-
pearances before Congress. The taxpayer originally deducted the con-
tribution as a gift, but after the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
determined that the N.E.C. did not qualify so as to permit the deduc-
tion, the taxpayer claimed the payment was not a gift but a payment
for services "to be performed by them as experts in the field of mone-
18
 A recent report on campaign contributions indicates that at least 15 Americans
each gave more than $50,000 to national political campaigns in 1968. The report admit-
ted that much information remained hidden due to the absence of, or lack of utilization
of, laws requiring strict disclosure of funds received by politicians, and emphasized the
difficulties involved in determining the actual donor of property. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 31,
1971, at 43, col. 5.
19 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2512(b).
15 Lowndes, Consideration and the Federal Estate and Gift Taxes: Transfers for
Partial Consideration, Relinquishment of Marital Rights, Family Annuities, the Widow's
Election, and Reciprocal Trusts. 35 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 50, 51 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as Lowndes]; Commissioner v. Bristol, 121 F.2d 129, 134 (1st Cir. 1941).
16 Estate of Koert Bartman, 10 T.C. 1073 (1948) ; William H. Grass, 7 T.C. 837
(1946).
17 The First Circuit, in Commisiioner v. Bristol, 121 F.2d 129 (1st Cir. 1941), held
that although a relinquishment of a wife's statutory rights pursuant to an antenuptial
agreement under which property was transferred by the husband was sufficient consid-
eration to support a contract, it was not sufficient to satisfy the gift tax requirement
since the transferor did not receive an adequate and full equivalent in money or some-
thing which could be valued in money. Cf. Catherine S. Beveridge, 10 T.C. 915 (1948),
acquiesced in 1949-1, Cum. Bull. 1; Estate of Gertrude Friedman, 40 T.C. 714 (1963).
18 97 F. Supp. 944 (D. Del. 1951).
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tary,.business and political conditions in the United States and else-
where . DuPont, a man of large investments, contended that the
economic trends of the country directly affected the security of his in-
vestments. The court, concerned only with the petitioner's liability for
the gift tax, noted that the consideration he purportedly received must
be reducible to a money value if the taxpayer were to avoid a gift tax.
The court held that it was impossible to determine to what extent, if
any, an improved economy, leading to increased investments of a value
greater than that of the property transferred, could be attributed
solely to the action of the N.E.C. 2° Furthermore, the court found that
these payments were not ordinary business expenses, nor were they
payments for services which elicit a recognizable return. By way of
dicta, the court noted that this situation is somewhat analogous to a
transfer of property to a political party having the same economic
views as the prospective transferor.' Certainly the position of the
court was valid, since the taxpayer had not shown full and adequate
consideration.received in money or money's worth attributable solely
to his contribution to the N.E.C. A two-pronged test proving the
N.E.C.'s direct effect on the economy, and proving the extent to which
the donor's contribution to the N.E.C. enabled it to advance the econ-
omy, had to be met before exempting the donor from a gift tax.
An exception to the "full and adequate consideration" require-
ment is available to the taxpayer if the transfer is made "in the ordi-
nary course of business (a transaction which is bona fide, at arm's
length, and free from any donative intent)." 22 But even with these
three criteria the courts have had difficulty in developing a well-defined
test for transfers which are "in the ordinary course of business." 22
Initial inquiry into the "in the ordinary course of business" exception
requires a determination of whether this test applies only to actual
commercial transactions or whether it also applies to transactions
which are merely business related, or which are gratuitous. 24 In Com-
missioner v. Wemyss,25 the Supreme Court held that the transfer of
property subject to an antenuptial agreement was not within the ordi-
nary course of business since the transfer was not made at arm's
length, and hence was taxable. Furthermore,
to reinforce the evident desire of Congress to hit all the pro-
tean arrangements which the wit of man can devise that are
not business transactions within the meaning of ordinary
speech, the Treasury Regulations make clear that no genuine
business transaction comes within the purport of the gift tax
to Id. at 946.
Id. at 947.
21 Id.
22 Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8.
23 Merten's Law of Federal Gift and Estate Taxation, § 34.19 (1959).
24 See R. Paul, 2 Federal Estate and Gift Taxation 1113 (1942).
22 324 U.S. 303 (1945).
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by excluding "a sale, exchange, or other transfer of property
made in the ordinary course of business .... MC
The Court's use of "genuine" connotes a limitation of "business trans-
actions" to actual commercial activities rather than to gratuitous
transfers.
Such an approach was subsequently considered in Estate of Mon-
roe D. Anderson,27
 a case in which the decedent taxpayer was an exec-
utive in a cotton merchandising business. In an attempt to relieve him-
self of some of the company's responsibilities, and to increase the
efficiency of the management of the company, which in turn would
serve to protect his investments, Anderson had transferred some of his
stock, at a nominal fee, to the younger executives of his company. The
Tax Court found that
the pertinent inquiry for gift tax purposes is whether the
transaction is a genuine business transaction . . . . Surely it
will not be said that there may not be a genuine business
transaction not directly connected with the taxpayer's trade
or business or even though the taxpayer be not engaged in
"carrying on any trade or business," within the scope of that
term as limited by Higgins v. Commissioner. . . . Bad bar-
gains, sales for less than market, sales for less than adequate
consideration in money or money's worth are made every day
in the business world, for one reason or another; but no one
would think for a moment that any gift is involved, even in
the broadest possible sense of the term "gift."28
Since these sales were bona fide, at arm's length, and in the ordinary
course of business, they were not subject to the gift tax." The decision
is significant in indicating that the purpose behind the exception was
directed at actual commercial transactions which result in bad bar-
gains or losses but which could not be considered gifts."
The courts, however, have not felt constrained to limit the appli-
cation of the exception to commercial transactions, applying it to cer-
tain family agreements as well. In Harris v. Commissioner,31 the peti-
tioner and her husband, anticipating a divorce, reached an agreement
as to their property interests designed to survive any decree which the
court might enter. Under Nevada law," a divorce decree must include
an equitable disposition of the parties' property. A Nevada divorce
26 Id. at 306.
27 B.T.C. 706 (1947).
28 Id. at 720; See also R. Townsend, Up the Organization 178 (1970).
29 See William H. Gross, 7 T.C. 837 (1946), where a "business" transaction involv-
ing members of a family was subject to a gift tax because of a presumption of donative
intent.
3° See Eva B. Hull, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1076 (1962); Carl E. Weller, 38 T.C.
790 (1962).
82 340 U.S. 106 (1950) ; see Lowndes, supra note 15, at 63.
82 Nev. C.L. (Supp. 1931-1941) § 9463, now Nev. C.L. 125.150 (1967).
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court subsequently upheld this agreement as a just settlement in grant-
ing an absolute divorce. The Supreme Court, with four Justices dis-
senting, denied the government's contention that the transfer was sub-
ject to a gift tax. The Court noted that transactions between husband
and wife should be within the scope of "ordinary course of business"
when enforceable under the law. The Court indicated, however, that a
voluntary unraveling of business interests is subject to a gift tax."
Hence, although Stern cites this case to demonstrate the broad scope
of transactions covered by Treasury Regulation Section 25.2512-8,
Harris on its facts indicates that the transfer must be more than
simply an informal agreement concerning the division of property in-
terests. Rather, it must be a judicially approved settlement of property
interests in order to be considered as made within "the ordinary course
of business.""
Apart from cases involving familial transfers of property, the
Fifth Circuit also cited Shelton v. Lockhart." In Shelton, the peti-
tioner was an Indian Princess considered legally incompetent due to
her Indian blood. During the period of her incompetence, the United
States held tribal property in trust for her. Wishing to be declared le-
gally competent, thus releasing the property from the trust, she nego-
tiated with the Bureau of Indian Affairs which agreed to declare her
competent only if she executed an instrument placing $300,000 in
trust for her children. The Bureau and petitioner compromised at
$200,000, and she was declared competent. Although the Commis-
sioner assessed a gift tax on the value of the trust, the district court
held that the transfer in trust was not subject to the tax. Specifically
not basing its decision on the question of whether the price of freedom
would suffice as full and adequate consideration, the court found that
the transaction represented a business venture between the plaintiff
and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The court found that the requisite
criteria of an ordinary course of business transfer were met, that is,
the transfer was the result of negotiation and compromise free from a
direct intent to give a gift to her children," even though not connected
with a continuing business or trade."
33 340 U.S. at 109. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, noted that since the parties stip-
ulated that this agreement would be binding upon divorce regardless of a separate
property settlement by the court, their agreement was not subject to approval by court
decree and should have been taxable. 340 U.S. at 112. This problem of full and adequate
consideration in divorce property settlements has largely been remedied by § 2516 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
811 See Rosenthal v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1953), which, although
supporting the proposition that family transactions could be treated as made "in the
ordinary course of business," was remanded for a determination of whether the three
criteria were present. See also Commissioner v. Barnard's Estate 176 F.2d 233 (2d Cir.
1949) ; Estate of Gertrude Friedman, 40 T.C. 714 (1963).
35 154 F. Supp. 244 (W.D. Mo. 1957).
a° See Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U.S. 184 (1943), where the Court stated that a
desire to pass on the family fortune was not within the meaning of "in the ordinary
course of business."
37 The Fifth Circuit also relied upon a Revenue Ruling involving citizens who had
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'the cases thus indicate that although a transaction might not be
made in a commercial sense, there is still required a bargaining aspect
that would be legally enforceable in order to satisfy the regulation's
requirement that the transaction be at "arm's length, bona fide, and
free from donative intent." Neither the Internal Revenue Code nor the
Treasury Regulations specifically define these three separate elements,
a fact probably attributable to the overlapping qualities of the ele-
ments and, consequently, to the difficulty of determining precise defini-
tions. Although the majority of cases brought under the "in the ordi-
nary course of business" exception do not attempt to distinguish the
individual elements within the facts of the case, several courts have
commented upon the presence or absence of the criteria.
The "bona fide" element at common law refers to "a thing done
really, with a good faith, without fraud or deceit. . . ."" Under con-
tract Iaw, the term "good faith" is without a general meaning and
serves to exclude a wide range of forms of bad faith" which a judge
might decide to prohibit. This concept was applied in a gift tax case"
in which property was sold at less than fair market value for the pur-
pose of delegating managerial tasks to the vendee, a transaction which
disclosed no acts of bad faith. The absence in Stern of any indication
that Mrs. Stern acted in bad faith, as shown by her open admission of
the purpose and the form of the transfer, supports the existence of the
"bona fide" element. Her belief that the transaction was not subject to
the gift tax should not denote an act of bad faith.
The element of "donative intent" lends itself to a more explicit
analysis. In determining whether the transferor intended to pass prop-
erty without receiving anything in exchange, 41 an examination of the
recipient of the transfer, and the purpose for which the gift was given
are essential. Where the recipient of the transfer is a party to whom a
person would be more likely to make a gift than to make a contract,
such as a transfer to a family member, 42 the element of donative intent
is present. This theory should be presumed to apply to transfers to a
contributed money to a bank as trustee to purchase land. The bank delivered possession
of the land to a manufacturing company, and, in consideration, the company agreed to
make 10 annual payments to the trustee, pay all taxes, insure the building, and operate
the company for 10 years. In default thereof the trustee could take possession. The
trustee agreed to deed the property in fee simple to the company if the aggregate annual
payroll reached a certain amount. The Internal Revenue Service ruled that the transfers
by the citizens were at arm's length, bona fide, and free from any donative intent, and
hence not subject to the gift tax. But clearly there, unlike in Stern, the parties negotiated
at arm's length as to the benefits the donee would provide in return, such as money,
jobs, maintenance of property and prosperity for the town. The fact that the value of
what the donors were receiving in return might not be equivalent to the property trans-
ferred was unimportant. Rev. Rul. 68-558, 1968-2 Cum. Bull. 415.
88 Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (4 Dail.) 199, 240 (1796).
32 Summers, "Good Faith" In General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 54 Va. L. Rev. 195, 201 (1968).
48 Eva B. Hull, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1076 (1962).
41 J. Beveridge, Law of Federal Gift Taxation 3.02 (1958).
42 William H. Gross, 7 T.C. 837 (1946).
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political candidate since such a person is typically the recipient of
gifts. Furthermore, a lack of donative intent is frequently established
where the transferor's purpose is to receive a direct benefit in return
for his transfer, such as the relinquishment of managerial duties" or
the settlement of a property interest." The facts in Stern indicate the
presence of donative intent, since there was no evidence that Mrs.
Stern received or would receive a direct benefit from the political can-
didates who profited from her contributions."
The requirement of "arm's length" is satisfied when parties, bar-
gaining with their own interests at stake, compromise on an agreement
which confers benefits upon both parties. Where one party has "bar-
gained" but has not protected his own interests, the resulting transfer
would not be considered to have been made at arm's length." The
transfer in Stern was not the product of arm's length bargaining be-
tween the transferor and political party because there was no direct
proof that her interests in fact benefited from the transfer. Indeed, any
return received by Mrs. Stern on her gift would be the return received
by all citizens, whether contributors or not. Following the DuPont ra-
tionale, a bargain could not be reached where an organization's effec-
tiveness could not be attributable solely to the contribution of the
transferor.47 No case cited in Stern involved a transaction wherein the
parties did not specifically agree to terms which included the relin-
quishment of rights by, or the conferral of benefits directly upon, the
adverse party.
The Fifth Circuit, although appropriately rejecting the govern-
ment's limited interpretation of Treasury Regulation Section 25.2512-8,
has implied that the "in the ordinary course of business" exception could
be extended beyond its existing bounds." This exception has seldom
been applied to situations not involving genuine commercial transac-
tions, and where it has been so applied, the transactions encompassed
situations where property was not gratuitously transferred. To suggest
that the purpose of the gift tax—the prevention of depletions of the
taxpayer's estate without subjecting the property to the federal taxing
power—could be defeated in the area of political contributions by the
tenuous argument that the expenditures were made at arm's length,
bona fide, and free from donative intent, is without support in the case
law. Yet, although the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's inter-
pretation of the Treasury Regulation, in its concluding paragraph it
43 Estate of Monroe D. Anderson, S T.C. 706 (1947).
44 Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106 (1950).
43 See text at note 18.
43 See Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945).
47 See p. 1271 supra.
48 Cf. "It is difficult to see why any transfer which is actuated exclusively by a
desire to better the transferor's economic situation, as distinguished from a donative in-
tent, should be taxed as a gift, even though the transfer is not connected with any
business." C. Lowndes & R. Kramer, Estate and Gift Taxes, 32.9 (2d ed. 1962).
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submitted two other bases which alternatively would have supported
its decision.
The court concluded that the commercial and economic overtones
of the transactions suggested that Mrs. Stern was making an economic
investment. Apart from the "in the ordinary course of business" excep-
tion, the court indicated that the appellee could claim that she would
receive services and goods in return for her transfer; hence, this was
not a gift. Applying the rationale of the DuPont case," however, such
argument would necessarily fail. The DuPont court, under the facts in
Stern, would reject the purely speculative return on the money the
transferor might receive without proof of a clearer causal connection
between the contribution and the alleged returned consideration. The
mere statement that transactions are "permeated with commercial and
economic factors"" does not force the conclusion that they constitute
an economic investment rather than a gift. The word "gift" would be-
come meaningless under such a standard, and would disregard the in-
tent of Congress that "gift" be defined in the broadest and most com-
prehensive sense. 51 The Code specifically exempts from the gift tax
transfers to charitable, scientific and educational institutions.' Yet,
such transfers could be considered "economic investments" since they
are indirectly "permeated" with economic factors. By specifically ex-
empting those contributions, however, Congress implied that they
would otherwise be subject to the tax. It would thus be incongruous for
the courts to exempt a contribution which is no more of an economic
investment than those contributions specifically exempted by the Con-
gress. Such a judicial approach would render provisions under the
Code superfluous, and, accordingly, the exemption of political contri-
butions from the gift tax should be left to Congress.
The second factor noted in dicta in Stern was the control exer-
cised by the donor over the disbursement of the funds. The existence
of a transfer of property is essential to the imposition of a gift tax."
However, the Code and the courts have not looked to an accentuated
form in the area of transfers and have recognized numerous disguised
"transfer" arrangements under several theories. The Code applies the
gift tax "whether the transfer is in trust or otherwise, whether the gift
is direct or indirect. . . In reference to "indirect gifts" the Trea-
sury Regulations" stress the substance over the form of the transfer
by announcing that any transaction whereby property is conferred
upon another, regardless of the means or device employed, would con-
,
42 See p. 1270 supra.
50 436 F.2d at 1330.
51 H.R. Rep. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1931), S. Rep. No. 665, 72d Cong.,
1st Sess. 39 (1931).
62 Mt. Rev. Code of 1954, I 2522(a) (2) (1964).
63 Lowndes, An Introduction to the Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, 44 N.C.L. Rev.
1, 51 (1965).
54 Mt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2511(a).
66 Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) and (h) (3) (1958).
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stitute a gift subject to the gift tax. This approach might be applicable
in Stern where the contributors acted to benefit the political candidates
through the facade of having the Treasurer retain control of the funds
to pay for the donee's political campaign expenses.
An alternative approach to the determination of taxable transfers
requires the ascertainment of the cessation of the donor's dominion
and control over the property." One possible criterion by which to de-
termine whether the donor has relinquished control over the property
is whether the person in possession has a "substantial adverse inter-
est"" in the disposition of the property. However, judicial interpreta-
tion's of this phrase suggests that under the fact situation in Stern, the
Treasurer did not have a "substantial adverse interest" due to the
close relationship between, and the similarity of interests among Mrs.
Stern, the Treasurer, and the informal finance committee. In addition
to this approach, courts have faced the question of retention of control
in the area of transfers in trust. Decisions's have stressed, as a signifi-
cant indication of a transfer, the change of economic benefits resulting
from the relinquishment of the power to revoke a trust. Analogously,
in Stern, although the Treasurer retained physical possession of the
contributions, the respondent had not yet relinquished control of the
property. But when the money was paid for the campaign expenses,
dominion and control were relinquished and the transfers became com-
plete." Such an analogy must be permitted if the intent of Congress
"to close tax loopholes against ingenious trust instruments"' is to be
effectuated. The arrangement in Stern exemplified the type of inge-
nious transactions which were intended to be included within the scope
of the gift tax. The form of the transfer should not disguise the fact
that Mrs. Stern gave property for the benefit of political candidates.
Although the Fifth Circuit did not directly deny the application
of the gift tax on the theories that the transfers were made "in the or-
dinary course of business," that they were economic investments, or
that there had not been transfers of property, it implied such conclu-
sions by affirming the district court finding that the transaction was
bona fide, at arm's length, and free from donative intent. Clearly these
findings disregard the congressional purpose of the gift tax and the
case law under it. The recognition of transfers for the benefit of politi-
cal candidates as being outside the scope of the gift tax should be left
to Congress and not to the courts.
WILLIAM L. EATON
58 Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b) (1958).
67 Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(e) (1958).
58 Latta v. Commissioner, 212 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1954); Commissioner v. Prouty,
115 F.2d 331 (1st Cir. 1940).
69 Burnet v, Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280 (1933) ; Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176
(1943).
60 Higgins v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 237 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 658
(1942) ; Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39 (1939).
81 Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 'U.S. at 180.
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